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Non-technical Summary
In this paper, we analyze the heterogeneity of the venture capital
market. Concretely, we investigate whether the governance structures,
objectives, abilities and track records of different types of venture cap-
italists (bank-dependent, corporate, public and independent) have an
influence on their investment and divestment patterns. A natural play-
ing field for this analysis is the German venture capital market with
its wide variety of venture capitalists’ types. In contrast to the US,
where venture capital funds typically are independent entities, bank-
dependent and public venture capitalists have a large market share in
Germany. The study is based on a unique hand-collected database of
all venture-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) on Germany’s Neuer
Markt.
We find that significant differences among the different types of ven-
ture capitalists exist. The behavior of independent and corporate
venture capitalists is more similar to that of their US counterparts
whereas bank-dependent and public venture capital funds typically
are bridge investors rather than true venture capitalists. Independent
and corporate venture capitalists usually take larger equity positions,
syndicate more, use more often stage financing, invest at earlier stages,
finance their companies for longer periods of time and are able to bet-
ter manage the IPO timing. We explain this behavior by different
capabilities and experience on the one hand as well as differing aims
on the other hand. Thus, it seems that the joint provision of capital
and managerial support, which is a characteristic of venture capital
financing, is offered by independent and corporate venture capitalists
rather than by public and bank-dependent funds.
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Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the investment and divestment
patterns of different types of venture capitalists. Using a data set em-
bracing all venture-backed IPOs that occurred on Germany’s Neuer
Markt we investigate whether the governance structures, objectives,
abilities and track records of different types of venture capitalists have
a decisive influence on their behavior. Our main finding is that signifi-
cant differences among the different types of venture capitalists exist.
The behavior of independent and corporate venture capitalists is more
similar to that of US funds whereas bank-dependent and public ven-
ture capitalists typically are bridge investors rather than true venture
capitalists. Our findings may be interesting for policy makers, for
companies that seek capital and for venture capitalists who look for
syndication partners.
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1 Introduction
An obvious problem in the process of the transformation of an innova-
tive idea into a salable product is in many cases the lack of capital. A
less obvious but essential problem is often the poor managerial back-
ground of the owner of this idea. In an ideal case, venture capital
financing offers a joint provision of capital and managerial support.
Then, venture capitalists (VCs) play an active role in advising their
portfolio firms, providing them with necessary contacts and taking
principal decisions. Additionally, a company may profit from an in-
crease in its credibility if a renowned VC finances its ideas.
The positive role of venture capital is emphasized by a wide range
of literature. On the company level, empirical studies document the
contribution of this financing instrument to the creation of start-ups
(Gompers/Lerner/Scharfstein (2003)), their growth (Hellmann/Puri
(2000) for the US, Bottazzi/DaRin (2001) for Europe and Engel (2002)
for Germany), professionalization (Hellmann/Puri (2002)), better op-
erating performance (Rindermann (2003) or Jain/Kini (1995)) and
the certification of their quality (Megginson/Weiss (1991) or Lin/
Smith (1995)). Above this, on the aggregated level, venture capital
has a positive impact on economic growth (Keuschnigg (2001)) and
innovative activity (Kortum/Lerner (2000)).
These strengths of venture capital result from the combination of fi-
nancing, control and managerial support. Whereas the vast majority
of literature deals with the venture capital industry as being homoge-
nous, in this paper we test whether different types of VCs differ in their
strategies and hence in the value they add to their portfolio compa-
nies. Our hypothesis is that - due to the differences in the governance
structures, objectives, abilities and track records - different types of
VCs behave differently and play differing roles in their portfolio firms.
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Concretely, our goal is to find out whether there are systematic differ-
ences in the investment and divestment patterns of venture capitalists
due to their institutional background. A natural playing field for this
analysis is the German venture capital market with its wide variety of
VCs’ types. In contrast to the US, where venture capital funds typi-
cally are independent entities, bank-dependent and public VCs have
a large market share in Germany.
There are a few studies that deal with heterogeneities among venture
capital firms. The role of the VCs’ reputation on the underpricing of
their portfolio firms is considered e.g. by Barry et al. (1990). Beyond
this, Gompers (1993) and (1996) analyzes differences between young
and old VCs with regard to the holding period and the IPO timing.
Several papers deal with a certain type of VC and show its differences
to the rest. Examples are Hellmann/Lindsey/Puri (2003) for bank-
dependent, Gompers/Lerner (2000) for corporate and Bascha/Walz
(2002) for public VCs. In contrast to these studies we distinguish not
only between one type of VCs and the rest but we divide the sample
into four subgroups (public, bank-dependent, independent and corpo-
rate). Our data is described in section 2. A set of testable hypotheses
is derived in section 3. The results, which are presented in sections
4 (descriptive statistics) and 5 (multivariate analyses), support our
supposition of heterogeneity. We find significant differences between
different types of VCs in Germany. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Our data set
Our analysis was based on a unique hand-collected database of IPOs
on Germany’s Neuer Markt. The data on companies were obtained
from the Deutsche Bo¨rse AG and from the listing prospectuses. There
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were 327 IPOs on the Neuer Markt.2 We considered a company as
venture-backed if at least one of its shareholders was affiliated at a
national or an international venture capital association. According
to our definition, 138 (42.2%) of the IPOs on the Neuer Markt were
venture-backed. The venture capital firm that held the largest share
of the equity prior to the IPO was labeled the lead VC. The infor-
mation about the VCs’ type was collected from the following sources:
VentureXpert database, the directories of the German, European and
US venture capital associations (BVK, EVCA, NVCA) and webpages
of venture capital firms. We divided the IPOs into four subgroups
depending on the type of the lead VC (public, bank-dependent, inde-
pendent and corporate VCs). The group of public VCs in our sample
consisted of the subsidiaries of German Sparkassen and Landesbanken.
In these banks namely, public authorities have a large impact. Thus,
the group of bank-dependent VCs contained only subsidiaries of pri-
vate commercial banks.
3 Our hypotheses
3.1 Objectives
Our first set of hypotheses is based on the assumption of differing
objectives of different types of VCs.
According to Hellmann/Lindsey/Puri (2003), banks want to build
early relationships for their lending activities, which are banks’ core
business. Thus, they want to participate via their venture capital
subsidiaries in as many companies as possible in order to expand the
group of potential future borrowers. To achieve this with a given
2The Neuer Markt was launched in March 1997 and closed in June 2003.
3
amount of capital, bank-dependent and public VCs are expected to
take low equity positions for a short period of time.
H1a: Compared to other types of VCs, bank-dependent and public VCs
take lower equity positions, syndicate more, take their companies public
more rapidly and retain a lower share of their holdings beyond the IPO.
There is an alternative explanation that leads to similar conclusions.
Bank-dependent and public VCs in Germany typically enter into silent
partnerships or debt contract with companies before they, later on,
participate in their equity capital. Since our database only includes
equity financing, we should find out that:
H1b: Bank-dependent and public VCs take lower equity positions, in-
vest at later stages and take their portfolio companies public more
rapidly.
Bank-dependent and public VCs are usually more risk-averse. Above
this, public VCs are often interested primarily in the promotion of
local firms rather than the rate of return. The implication is that:
H2: The portfolio companies of independent and corporate VCs achieve
higher valuations which lead to their lower book-to-market ratios, higher
market values and larger issue sizes.
Through investing in young innovative companies via corporate VCs,
large corporations pursue strategic goals. Typically, their aim is to
profit from the synergies between their own and the portfolio compa-
nies’ production, which is usually closely related to their core business.
Thus, they do not want to share the innovative ideas of their portfolio
companies with other VCs. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
H3: Corporate VCs syndicate less.
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3.2 Abilities and strengths
The second set of hypotheses results from different strengths and abil-
ities of different types of VCs. Bank-dependent and public VCs have
a comparative advantage in providing money whereas, due to their
experience and established networks, the managerial support is the
strength of independent and corporate VCs.
According to the value-added-hypothesis (see Tykvova´ (2003)), inde-
pendent and corporate VCs are able to create a substantial additional
value and aim therefore at long-term relationships with their portfo-
lio companies. On the other hand, the skill set of bank-dependent
and public VCs is exhausted rather quickly. This implies their shorter
holding periods, orientation towards later stages and lower equity po-
sitions (as already indicated by H1b) as well as less syndication (as
stated in H1a). Whereas corporate and independent VCs give both,
advice and money, bank-dependent and public VCs are typically weak
in providing the managerial support. Therefore, their portfolio com-
panies should have lower valuations which is in accordance with H2.
Above this, due to their poorer sophistication and a less intensive
involvement in the company’s management:
H4: Bank-dependent and public VCs use less stage financing.
Lerner (1994) shows that VCs try to optimize their exit timing. They
go public when equity valuations are high and employ private financ-
ings when values are lower. Our supposition is that sophisticated VCs
are able to better manage the IPO timing.
H5: Companies of independent and corporate VCs go public during
hot issue periods with a higher probability than firms backed by public
and bank-dependent VCs.
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Bank-dependent and public VCs typically are only bridge investors
who provide money shortly before the IPO and who want to exit
quickly, at best directly at the IPO.
H6: Bank-dependent and public VCs retain a smaller fraction of their
old shares beyond the IPO.
3.3 Certification and signaling
The third set of hypotheses is based on certification and signaling
issues. The suggestion is that companies backed by corporate and
independent VCs have high whereas companies backed by public VCs
have low transparency. A low transparency results in the necessity to
signal the firm quality. VCs may do this by showing their willingness
to retain shares beyond the IPO and (or) by a larger underpricing (see
e.g. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989)). This leads us to the following two
hypotheses:
¬H6: Corporate and independent VCs retain a smaller fraction of
their old shares beyond the IPO.
H7: Companies of public VCs have the largest underpricing.
3.4 Grandstanding
The fourth possible explanation for the differences is the grandstand-
ing phenomenon (see Gompers (1993) and (1996)). According to it,
the reason why some VCs take their portfolio firms public too early
(after short financing periods) is that these VCs want to increase their
reputation in order to be able to attract capital for new funds. Sig-
naling their quality to investors plays the most decisive role for inde-
pendent VCs. Hence, contradictory to H1 :
H8: Independent VCs take their companies public more rapidly.
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4 Descriptive statistics
In this section the set of hypotheses H1 -H4 and H6 -H8 is tested us-
ing descriptive statistics. The results are provided in Table 1. The
hypothesis H5 is examined in the next section. H1b, H2, H3, H4 and
H7 are confirmed. The data do not give clear evidence for either H6
or ¬H6. Further, the syndication hypothesis (H1a) and the grand-
standing hypothesis (H8 ) can be denied.
Independent VCs (INDEP) syndicate more whereas bank-dependent
(BANK), public (PUBLIC) and corporate (CORP) VCs syndicate less
(contradictory to H1a, consistent with H3 ). Bank-dependent and pub-
lic VCs employ fewer financing rounds before they take their portfolio
firms public (consistent with H4 ). Public and bank-dependent VCs
enter in later stages, finance their companies for shorter periods of
time before they take them public and take lower equity positions
(consistent with H1a and H1b, the shorter span of time is contradic-
tory to H8 ). Compared to other subgroups, independent VCs retain
the largest fraction of their old shares beyond the IPO (consistent
with H1a and H6 ), namely 78% on average. However, the difference
to the rest is significant only at a low level. The average valuations
are as predicted (H2 ) and result in a large average market value, a low
book-to-market ratio and a large issue size for companies backed by
independent and corporate VCs. Companies financed by public VCs
are underpriced most heavily (consistent with H7 ). The difference is,
however, not significant.
5 Multivariate analyses
We next explore the determinants of the duration of the pre-IPO
venture capital financing in a multivariate regression approach. We
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conduct a hazard rate analysis to model the duration between the
first venture capitalist’s equity holdings and the IPO, employing two
commonly used parametric models (Weibull and exponential) and one
semi-parametric model (Cox proportional hazard model). All three
models deliver very similar results. It is a good indicator of the ro-
bustness of these estimations.
Firstly, we estimate the models with a large matrix of dependent
variables (“full” models). This matrix consists of a quality variable
(market-to-book ratio), a domestic dummy (company from Germany
or from abroad), a set of dummy variables for industries and for VC-
types as well as a start-up dummy (start-up financing or not). The
results are not reported here. With the help of the Akaike information
criterion we then determine the optimal size of the matrix of explana-
tory variables. In all three model specifications (Weibull, exponential
and Cox) the variables chosen on behalf of this criterion are the same
and include INDEP, START-UP and two of the dummy variables for
industries.
We report regression outcomes in Table 2. Our results provide fur-
ther evidence for the differing behavior of different types of VCs. The
dummy variable INDEP always belongs to the regressions and its coef-
ficient is always negative at a high significance level. Thus, due to the
differences in the venture capitalists’ experience and aims (consistent
with H1 ), independent VCs finance their portfolio firms for longer pe-
riods than other VCs before they take them public. This contradicts
to the grandstanding hypothesis (H8 ). Further, companies that be-
long to the branches internet and media & entertainment are financed
for significantly shorter periods. The investment in a start-up com-
pany leads to longer financing periods. Simple OLS regressions deliver
similar results as the hazard rate models discussed above. The vari-
ables selected by the optimization of the Akaike criterion and their
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coefficients’ signs are exactly the same as in the hazard rate models
and are not reported here.
Concerning the optimization of IPO timing, all nine firms backed by
a corporate VC in our sample went public during a hot issue period.
We conduct a logit regression for the hot issue dummy as dependent
variable with dummies for the remaining VC-types, start-up financing
and industries as explanatory variables. The results are depicted in
Table 3. We find confirmation for the hypothesis H5 that independent
and corporate VCs are able to better manage the timing of their IPOs.
6 Conclusion
In the German market independent and corporate VCs typically have
differing investment patterns from bank-dependent and public VCs.
Moreover, the behavior of the former two types of VCs is more similar
to that of US venture capital funds as described in the literature (e.g.
Barry (1994) and Sahlman (1990) for an overview). Independent and
corporate VCs usually take larger equity positions, syndicate more,
use more often stage financing, invest at earlier stages, finance their
companies for longer periods of time and are able to better manage
the IPO timing. Compared with that, bank-dependent and public
VCs often act as bridge investors rather than true venture capitalists.
We explain this behavior by different capabilities and experience on
the one hand as well as differing aims on the other hand. Our findings
may be interesting for policy makers, for companies that seek capital
and for VCs who look for syndication partners.
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Table 1 -  Descriptive statistics
This table provides means of variables associated with the pre-IPO venture
capital financing, the venture capitalists’ behavior at the IPO, the characteristics
of the company and its issue. The firms are divided into four subgroups
depending on the type of the lead VC. We conduct a standard two-sided t-test
(allowing for unequal variances) to analyze the differences in means between
the subgroups of a certain VC-type and the rest. One, two and three asterisks
point to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. An asterisk in brackets
indicates significance at the 15% level.
PUBLIC          BANK               INDEP         CORP
Pre-IPO venture capital financing
No. of VCs  1.3  ***            1.3  ***              2.3  ***        1.4 (*)
No. of ROUNDS  1.3                    1.1  ***              2.1  ***        1.5
STAGE (0-2)  1.67 (*)            1.52  **              1.11  ***      1.25
Pre-IPO LENGTH (years)  0.93 (*)            1.08  *                1.75  **        2.02
Pre-IPO Share of VCs (%) 18.22  *            23.10                  27.97           35.89
Behavior of the VCs at the IPO
Post-IPO Share of VCs (%)  9.22  **           12.41                 16.3  **         15.47
RETAINED by the VCs
(% of their old shareholdings)
   72                     72                     78 (*)             69
Company and issue characteristics
AGE at IPO (years)  14.49               13.31                  11.24              11.63
MARKET VALUE (Mill.  €)  205.70            177.80  ***        288.40 **       345.40
BOOK-TO-MARKET (× 10 -³)  35.20               36.80  ***          21.10 **       18.40 *
ISSUE SIZE  (Mill. €)  33.40  **         40.00  **           57.30 *       78.50 (*)
UNDERPRICING (%)  80.01               49.30                 47.10             33.74
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Table 2 - Hazard rate models: Duration of the VC financing
This table depicts the results of hazard rate models for the dependent variable:
duration of the pre-IPO venture capital financing. The choice of explanatory
variables in each model is based on the optimization of the Akaike information
criterion. If the estimated coefficient is higher than 0, then this variable increases
the hazard ratio, and vice versa. One, two and three asterisks point to
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The number of observations is 119.
Dependent Variable: Duration of the pre-IPO venture capital financing
                                                                 Weibull    Exponential    Cox
Coefficients
START-UP -0.47*    -0.41*   -0.50**
INTERNET  1.09***     0.89***    1.10***
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT  1.84***     1.54***    1.72***
INDEP -0.36*    -0.32*   -0.49**
Model p-value                                      0.0000***     0.0000*** 0.0000***
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Table 3 - Logit models: Hot issue period
This table shows the results of logit models for the
dependent variable hot issue. Industry dummies and the
start-up dummy are used as control variables, but not
reported in the table. Two asterisks point to significance
at the 5% level. The number of observations is 120.
Dependent Variable: Hot issue
PUBLIC                             0.17        -0.03
BANK                                                 0.08           0.48
INDEP                               0.82**                       0.93**
CORP predicts success perfectly.
